Logic and phenomenology of incompleteness in illusory figures: new cases and hypotheses by Pinna, Baingio & Grossberg, Stephen
Psychofenia - voI. IX, n. 15,2006 
Logic and phenomenology of incompleteness in illusory 
figures: New cases and hypotheses 
BAINGIO PINNA " STEPHEN GROSSBERG2 
l. lntroduction 
Why is it relevant to analyze the role of incompleteness in illusory 
figure formation? Incompleteness probes the generaI problems of organ­
ization of the visual world and object segregation. The organization 
problem is one of the most important problems in visual neuroscience; 
namely: How and why are a very large number of unorganized elements 
of the retinal image combined, reduced, grouped and segregated to cre­
ate visual objects? Within the problem of organization, illusory figures 
are often considered to be one of the best examples to understand how 
and why the visual system segregates objects with a particular shape. 
color, and depth stratification. Understanding the role played by incom­
pleteness in inducing illusory figures can thus be useful for understand­
ing the principI es of organization (the How) of perceptual forrns and the 
more generai logic of perception (the Why). To this purpose, incom­
pleteness is here studied by analyzing its underlying organization prin­
ciples and its inner logic. 
Incompleteness has been proposed to be one of the basic factors in 
inducing illusory figures . Indeed, some influential authors have hy­
pothesized that illusory figures are perceived if and only if the induc­
ing elements are incomplete. Gregory ( 1 972, 1 987) suggested that il­
lusory figures are similar to perceptual hypotheses postulated to ex­
plain the unlikely gaps within stimulus patterns.  This idea is derived 
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from Helmholtz's Likelihood principle (Helmholtz, 1 867). The well 
known Kanizsa's triangle (Kanizsa, 1 955 ,  1 979) would then be creat­
ed by a top-down cognitive hypothesis to explain the gaps (missing 
sectors of the disks and missing parts of the outline triangle) within 
the stimulus. Similarly, Rock ( 1 983, 1 987) proposed that fragments 
similar to familiar figures elicit the cognitive hypothesis that a surface 
is occluding missing parts of inducing elements. Symmetry, incom­
pleteness, interruptions, gaps, alignments among interruptions, famil­
iarity, expectations and generai knowledge are cues triggering the 
cognitive problem-solving processo Thus, in Kanizsa's triangle the 
alignment among gap terminations and the familiarity of the frag­
ments would elicit a cognitive hypothesis of a triangle occluding three 
disks and an outline triangle. Coren ( 1 972) considered the incom­
pleteness of the stimulus as a depth cue that elicits the hypothesis of 
an occluding triangle. 
Starting from a Gestalt background, Kanizsa ( 1 955, 1 979) suggested 
that the necessary factor for the formation of the illusory triangle is the 
presence of incompletenesses ,  or open figures, which activate amodal 
completion and closure processes that "create" complete perceptual ele­
ments behind a partially occluding illusory triangle. 
The role of incompleteness i s  studied in the next three sections by: 
( 1 )  defining the inner logic subtended by use of the term "incomplete­
ness", (2) presenting new cases to c1arify the phenomenology of incom­
pleteness as a necessary and sufficient condition, and (3) suggesting an 
alternative hypothesis to explain illusory figures after analyzing prob­
lems with the incompleteness hypothesis. 
2. The logic and the paradox 01 "incompleteness" 
According to previous theoretical views, incompleteness was consid­
ered as a geometrical/structural factor that triggers illusory contour for­
mation but, at the same time, as a perceptual property, beforehand, per­
ceived as such and, afterwards, activating object hypotheses or comple­
tion processes. However, from a logical point of view if incompleteness 
is assumed as a geometrical factor: 
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(i) it cannot be defined as incompleteness, because the term "incom­
pleteness" implies a perceptual phenomenon and not a geometrical 
property; 
(ii) consequently, the use of the term "incompleteness" leads to the 
experience error (Kohler, 1 947); that is, the implicit assumption that the 
structure of perceptual experience coincides with the optical array; 
(iii) furthermore, as a geometrical property it does not require any so­
lution, explanation or completion; 
(iv) nevertheless, by assuming that incompleteness, open figures, or 
irregular elements can activate dynamical gestalt tendencies toward 
amodal completion and closure, as such, these tendencies should show 
two states and not just one as they do: the preceding uncompleted and 
open state, and the succeeding completed and dosed one. This is even 
truer for the cognitive hypothesis. However, only one state is perceived. 
Thus, as a geometrical property, incompleteness cannot be a cause of it­
self as a perceptual phenomenon that in its turn determines something 
else, the illusory figure. 
If incompleteness is assumed as a perceptual property, it implies thal: 
(i) as such it cannot be considered the cause of another perceptual 
property at the same epistemological level; that is, if incompleteness is 
perceived as incompleteness, there is no need to be discounted or com­
pleted to cause and elicit illusory figures, especially because incomplete­
ness is in many cases a perceptual property independent from illusory 
figures; 
(ii) it cannot be considered as such because as soon as it is perceived 
it is unperceived (reductio ad absurdum); 
(iii) thus, the incompleteness of a perceptual object cannot be per­
ceived because once it is perceived it is immediately completed and ex­
plained; that is, it is first perceived as incompleteness and then complet­
ed: to be completed it should first be perceived as incomplete. This is 
paradoxicaJ: In fact, it is not perceived if and only if it is perceived, or it 
is perceived if and only if it is not perceived (the paradox of "incom­
pleteness"). The same paradox can be al so stated as follows: To perceive 
an incompleteness that has to be explained and completed, first, it should 
become a conscious phenomenal property and, then, it should become 




er words, the incompleteness is not perceived (completed) only if it is 
perceived (not completed); 
(iv) incompleteness considered as a depth cue implies that, as with ali 
other depth cues, it should be perceived, but if it is perceived it is not 
perceived; thus, the argument is the same as that in point (iii); 
(v) therefore, if it is a perceptual property, it is not a perceptual prop­
erty. In other words, incompleteness can never be perceived because it 
should be always completed. Said yet another way, incompleteness 
should never be perceived even under conditions independent from illu­
sory figures. 
The previous arguments reject incompleteness as a factor for ex­
plaining illusory figure formation on the basis of merely logical reason­
ing. In the next section, the role of incompleteness is further weakened 
and redefined through new phenomenological conditions. 
3. Phenomenology oJ incompleteness 
The aim of this section is to argue phenomenologically that incom­
pleteness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor in inducing illuso­
ry figures. The demonstration of this statement follows four steps: (i) in­
completeness is not a sufficient condition; (ii) illusory figures do not 
necessarily complete incompletenesses (reductio ad absurdum of the 
role played by incompleteness); (iii) the shape of incompleteness does 
not predict the shape of illusory figures; (iv) incompleteness is not a nec­
essary condition. 
In this section, the phenomenology of incompleteness is accom­
plished by demonstrating that gestalt principles of grouping and figure­
ground segregation of boundary contour discontinuities and brightness 
inhomogeneities underlie, acting as parallel factors, the formation of il­
lusory figures without invoking incompleteness. 
To demonstrate the phenomenological arguments, the spontaneous 
descriptions of subjects were recorded under the controlled conditions 
described in the next Generai Method section. 
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The stimuli were composed by the figures illustrated in the paper. 
The mean overall size of the stimuli was 10 .8 x 8.6 deg of visual angle. 
The luminance of the white (background) paper under our test condi­
tions was 80 . 1  cd/m'. Black components had a luminance contrast of 
0.97. Stimuli were presented on a computer screen under Osram 
Daylight fluorescent light (250 lux, 56000 K) and were observed binoc­
ularly from a distance of 50 cm with freely moving eyes. 
Different groups of twenty observers, if not otherwise stated, de­
scribed only one stimulus. This was done to avoid the possibility that the 
perception of one stimulus might influence the perception of another. 
New experiments, not reported here , demonstrated that the following 
phenomenal descriptions could change by presenting different se­
quences of the stimuli. 
The subjects were naive as to the purpose ofthe experiments. Ali had 
normaJ or corrected-to-norma1 vision. 
The subject's task was to report what they perceived by describing il. 
There was a training period preceding the experiment. During practice, 
subjects viewed some known figures from the illusory figure literature 
(e.g., Kanizsa's triangle, etc .). Observation lime was unlimited. Ali the 
observers quite promptly reported a description. Within the paper, if not 
otherwise stated, the reported descriptions contain the same words used 
by the subjects during the description of each stimulus and concern the 
phenomenal results obtained with a significant number of subjects (? 
15) .  The subject descriptions are reported in italics and in quotation 
marks. In almost ali studied conditions, the subjects were asked to sketch 
out what they perceived. Where necessary to clarify and specify the sub­
jects' percepts, the results of the sketches are included. 
3.2. Incompleteness is noI a sufficien! condition 
The first phenomenological argument states that incompleteness is 
not a sufficient condition in inducing illusory figures. A condition A (in­
completeness) is said to be suf icient for a condition B (illusory figure), 
if (and only if) the truth (existence or occurrence) of A brings about the 
truth (existence or occurrence) of B. In other words, A cannot occur 




Even if the necessary logical condition cannot be easily disproved -
namely, that all illusory figures contain incomplete inducing elements or 
that complete inducers cannot produce illusory figures (see Section 3.5), 
it can be easily demonstrated that not all occurrences of incomplete ele­
ments produce illusory figures (the sufficient condition). Within previ­
ous models,  the sufficient condition is less interesting than the necessary 
one, but it is nonetheless important towards understanding the nature of 




Conditions showing that incomplete­
ness is not a sufflcient condition and 
the role of gestalt principle of group­
ing of concave discontinuities: (a) an 
incomplete square not inducing an il­
lusory figure; (b) an irregular illusory 
amoeboid figure partially occluding 
four squares obtained by grouping in­
completenesses; (c) by breaking the 
good continuation of Cb) the illusory 
amoeboid largely disappears; C d) the 
articulation without rests factor seg­
regates an illusory figure invading and 
par tially occluding the black square. 
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Figure I a is an example of a phe­
nomenal incomplete square not pro­
ducing an illusory figure. It is inter­
esting to noti ce that Figure l a is per­
ceived simply as an "incomplete 
square IVith tIVO missing parts curved 
imvard on the lower-right side and on 
the corner" . The tenn "incomplete" is 
merely phenomenal. More specifical­
Iy, this kind of incompleteness ap­
pears like a gnaw or a nibble. 
From an epistemological and logi­
cal point of vie w, the distinction be­
tween the terrn "incompleteness" and a 
mere geometrical terrn, like, for exam­
pie, "concave discontinuities" of the 
contours of a square-like shape, is nec­
essary: This geometrical property is 
not subjected to the previous logical 
arguments and paradoxes. At the same 
time, the expression "concave discon­
tinuity" can also have a phenomenal 
meaning. The concave discontinuities 
are perceived, but they do not require 
any completion and, more generally, 
they do not tend to any other perceptu-
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al state . Thus, from an epistemological and phenomenological point of 
view, it can be stated tha!: "geometrical concave discontinuities, such as 
those illustrated in Figure l a, induce the perception of an incomplete 
square" . 
By saying "concave discontinuities", our aim is not to define incom­
pleteness. Instead, the term "concave discontinuity" highlights the role 
played by discontinuities along the boundaries that may be said to include 
incompletenesses, and that can be related to principles of grouping and fig­
ure-ground segregation. For example, if a concave discontinuity region 
segregates from other boundaries, because of similarity (or dissimilarity), 
they can group with similar concave discontinuous boundaries, as illustrat­
ed in the next figures. The replacement of incompletenesses with "concave 
discontinuities" is not considered either in geometrical or in phenomenal 
terms, but as a dynamic process of grouping and figure-ground segregation. 
It allows us to overcome the logical and phenomenal critiques that can be 
made against the term "incompleteness". Furthermore, it allows one to sug­
gest hypotheses that are not restricted to illusory figures and that are basic 
for the segmentation and organization process of vision. This alternative 
way to consider incompleteness will be c1arified below. 
Concerning the result of Figure l a, in defense of the cognitive and 
Kanizsa hypotheses, one can say that the reason why the incompleteness 
in Figure l a  does not induce an illusory figure is that the incompleteness 
shown does not need to be completed. Since this implies that incom­
pleteness is not a sufficient factor, such examples elucidate the role 
played by incompleteness and, more particularly, the problem regarding 
under what conditions concave discontinuities are perceived as incom­
pletenesses or as illusory figures. Thus, if incompleteness is not a suffi­
cient factor, then the specific question is: Under which geometrical con­
ditions does incompleteness get completed, as suggested by Gregory, 
Rock, Coren and Kanizsa? A possible answer to the question is illustrat­
ed in Figure I b,  where by arranging the incompletenesses of four 
squares similar to the one in Figure l a in a grid, "an irregular illusory 
amoeboid figure partially occluding four squares is perceived" . 
By comparing these conditions with those in Figure l a, the c1assical 
laws of organization in perceptual forms, as described by Wertheimer 




tinuities group on the base of proximity, dosure, similarity of contours 
and good continuation factors , creating an amoeboid shape. Therefore, 
by breaking their good continuation, as in Figure l e, "the illusory amoe­
boid largely disappears". The roles of the dosure factor and, in addition, 
of the articulation-without-rests faetar are shown in Figure Id .  The 
eurved line is the rest, ineluded within the whole organization, assuming 
"the perceptual role of the boundary of the illusory figure invading and 
partially occluding the black square". A similar result i s  obtained in 




Different roles of incompletenesses in 
different fonn organizations: (a) an in­
complete (gnawed or nibbled) black 
polygon: (b) an illusory white paste. as 
painted with a tempera. in the outer 
and inner edge of the polygon; (c) and 
(d) non-homogeneous paintings across 
and along the inducing elements. 
Figure 2a appears as "an incomplete 
black polygon, whose incompleteness 
is perceived as an erased part of the 
polygon", while Figure 2b appears as 
"an illusory white paste, as painted 
with a tempera, in the outer and inner 
edge of the polygon". In Figure 2a, dif­
ferent1y from Figure 2b, "very weak or 
no illusory contours are perceived out­
side the polygon". It is worth high­
lighting that the incompleteness of 
Figure 2a assumes a specific formo 
"Deletion or erasure". As a conse­
quence, from a phenomenological 
point of view it is not a mere incom­
pleteness but "something" at a more 
specific level and different from the 
previous incompletenesses: "A gnaw 
or a nibble". Therefore, according to 
cognitive and gestalt models, the term 
ineompleteness is an undetermined 
property that can assume a large num-
ber of forms. This uncertainty further 
weakens the phenomenological role played by incompleteness as consid­
ered by gestalt and cognitive models. As can be observed in Figures 2c and 
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2d, "tlle illusory figures appear as 11011-
homogeneolls paintings across Gnd 0-
long tile illducing elemenlS". 
Incompleteness can be reconsidered 
in the light of gestalt grouping princi­
ples even when it appears as a different 
and independent factor. In Figure 3a, 
"the word ART is perceived" (Pinna, 
1990). The similarity/dissimilarity in 
the type and shape of the boundaries 
composing the R letter as well as the 
grouping of concave discontinuities, 
due to the good continuation principle, 
can be responsible for the perception of 
the word ART. In conjunction with sim­
ilarity, the surroundedness principle of 
figure-ground segregation (Rubin, 
19 1 5 , 1 92 1 )  and past experience 
(Wertheimer, 1 923) likely influence the 
pop out of the R letter. "Tlle illusory R 
appears injront ojthe A and tile T, that 
eac" completes itself amodally". 
The role of past experience is more 
obvious in Figure 3b, where the simi­
larity/dissimilarity principle is weak­
ened and where the incompleteness 
within the T groups with the empty 
space between A and T, that by virtue 
of the surroundedness principle tends 
to appear as a figure. The surrounded­
ness principle is working as well with­
in the component R that can be consid­
ered as the incompleteness of T, which 
in its turn can be considered as a con­












Gesta!t grouping principles as alter­
natives to incompleteness: (a) the 
word ART is perceived due to sim­
ilarity/dissimilarity in the type and 
shape of the boundaries compos­
ing the R letter: (b) the illusory R e­
merges due to surroundedness 
and past experience principles; (c) 
the li ne separating the component 
of the R within the T weakens the 
emergence and segregation of the 
word ART and the R does not ap­
pear as an iIIusory figure; (d) The 
word ARTE is perceived and the E 
letter pops out due to past experi­
ence, surroundedness, good con­
tinuation, convex discontinuities a­
long the T letter, closure and artic­
ulation without rests; (e) and (1) 
due to proximity factor mutilated 
or incomplete O and the G do ap­
pear in front ofVs or; alternatively, 
two holes having V shapes partially 
showing a black background and a 




of the concave grouping principle (Wertheimer, 1 923), It is interesting 
to note that "Ihe R appears on Ihe same piane ol lhe A,  while partially 
occluding Ihe T', 
In Figure 3c, "Ihe word ART emerges again but less slrongly Ihan in 
Figure 3b". The presence of a line separating the component of the R 
within the T, and the empty space between the A and the T, together 
weaken the grouping of the R and favor the amodal completion of the 
former component behind the latter. "The R does noi appear as a clear 
illusory figure, even when il is clearly recognizelf' .  
In Figure 3d, "Ihe word ARTE (ltalian for ART) is now realf'. The let­
ter E is perceived despite the absence of incompletenesses or local con­
cave discontinuities of the R.  On the contrary, on its right side the T pres­
ents convexities or additions. Both R and E pop out from the background 
as figures, acquiring clear figurai qualities. "The letter E eme/ges from a 
black (upper-righl and lower-Iell corners) and while (upper-Iell and 
lower-righl corners) square Ihal appears as a backgrounlf'. "The E ap­
pears wi/h curved boundaries". The perception of the E and its back­
ground demonstrates that the boundaries belong unilaterally to the illu­
sory E. The E letter pops out as a figure likely because of the following 
principles: past experience, surroundedness, good continuation, convex 
discontinuities along the T letter, closure and articulation-without-rests. 
Despite the fact that perception of the four alphabetical letters seems to 
be ruled by different figurai principles, they group together making the 
reading of the word ARTE easy. 
Because the convex discontinuities along the right si de of the T are 
the opposi te of the concave discontinuities on the left si de that can be 
considered as the low-Ievel description of the incompleteness, the illu­
sory E letter is induced from something that is the opposite of incom­
pleteness; Le., convexities or additions. 
Illusory figures are not completed in Figures 3e and 3f (Cocco, Pinna 
& Spillmann, 2000), where the best expected solutions to the incom­
pletenesses on the basis of past experience are two black Vs, partially 
occluded, and an illusory O and G in front of them. However, "illusory 
conlours are nOI perceived in Ihe oulside edges ol lhe Vs" (20 out of 20 
subjects for each stimulus) . "The O and Ihe G do appear in lront olVs, 
buI ollly parlially, because Ihey are seen as incomplele or mutilalelf'. 
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Other possible percepts are "two holes having V shapes partially show­
ing a black background and a while O and G partially perceived through 
them" ( 1 2  out of 20 subjects for each stimulus). 
These results suggest that grouping and figure-ground segregation 
principles play an important role in the explanalion of illusory figures 
and, more specifically, in the understanding of their perceptual organiza­
tion. However, by grouping "incompletenesses" through the synergistic 
combination of several principles, an illusory figure is not necessarily 
perceived (Figures 3e and 3f). How and whether it forms may depend on 
factors !hat are linked to grouping principles. In Figure 4a, the three cor­
ners of a virtual triangle are not grouped to produce an illusory triangu­
lar contour across the white space between the circles. Rather, the per­
cepl is Iypically of "a white Iriangle partially perceived Ihrough three 
holes in a white surface on a black backgrouncf'. "The disks become cir­
cular holes and their boundaries belong lO the white surface, while their 
black color completes itself amodally becoming a homogeneous black 
backgrouncf'. "The white space becomes a punched surface partially oc­
c/uding a white triangle". The effect is similar to the ones induced by 
Figures 3e and 3f, but it i s  interesting ali the more so because each cir­
cular inducing element is perceived as an incomplete disk, not as a cir­
cular hole, when presented separated from others. Il demonstrates the 
basic role of grouping principles that create emergent figures with new 
properties not reducible to the local components. 
A special case of proximity factar induces: (a) 
a white triangle partially perceived through 
three circular holes in a white sutface on a 
black background: (b) an illusory triangle; (c) 
an illusory triangle is perceived even when the 







Furthermore, these results demonstrate that, even if incompletenesses 
are aligned to favor good continuation, even if closure, proximity, and 
pragnanz factors work synergistically, even if the boundary contour ofthe 
triangle is thin enough lO induce a strong figurai effect (surroundedness 
and proximity principles of figure-ground segregation; Rubin, 192 1 ) ,  no 
illusory triangle may be created (Figure 4a), The opposite is perceived 
when viewing Figure 4b, where, by increasing the width of the boundary 
contours of the corners, "an illusory triangle is clearly perceived" , even 
if the grouping factors are weakened or pitted against it (Figure 4c). 
Figure 5 
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Variations in the ratio between the 
width of each intetTUption and the dis­
tance between the successive radiai 
lines induces no illusory circumference 
in (a), a strong illusory annulus in (b) and 
not any illusory circumference in the 
right side of (c) but only disjoint bright 
interruptions or dashes, while the oppo­
site is true in the left side of the (c). 
The same argument is illustrated 
in Figure 5a, where bright spaces, in­
terrupting each ray (incompleteness 
as interruption) in approximately its 
center, create "a circumference that 
is virtual but not illusory" . In fact, 
"the spaces may appear as disjoint 
bright spots on the radiai lines" ( 1 3  
out of 20 subjects). However, "the 
lines do not look like holes, as in 
Figure 4a, and the spots do nor com­
piete themselves amodally behind 
rhe whire surface". This result is in­
teresting in the light of the following 
possible counterargument, using 
Figure 4a, to the critique of incom­
pleteness .  This counterargument s­
tates that, even if in Figure 4a an il­
lusory triangle i s  not created, the re­
versed and complementary effect 
(disks as holes, illusory triangle as 
amodal triangle, etc.) is induced as 
an object hypothesis that can fili and explain the gaps within the stimu­
lus pattern. Thus, Ihe amodal triangle should represent the perceived so­
lution to the incompleteness within the circular holes. Figure 5a provides 
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a counterexample to this counterargument because "il does nOi complete 
the spots or brighI interruplions, as does happen by increasing the width 
of the circumference in Figure 5b". 
Without invoking the role of incompleteness ,  the factor that differen­
tiates the percepts in Figures 5a and 5b is the ratio between the width of 
each interruption and the distance between the successive radiai lines. 
By increasing the width of the amodal triangle of Figure 4a as in Figures 
4b and 4c, or of the virtual circumference of Figure 5a as in Figure 5b, 
this ratio changes accordingly. All else being equal, by decreasing the 
distance (angle) between the radial lines, the completion of the bright in­
terruptions becomes more likely and stronger, thereby creating an illuso­
ry circumference. As illustrated in Figure 5c, "the righI side of Ihe figure 
does not show any illusory circumference but only disjoint bright inter­
ruptions or dashes, while the opposite is true in thefigure's leji side". 
The perceived difference between the left and right sides of Figure 5c 
is strong enough to overcome any tendency of good continuation to 
weaken the difference between the two sides and enhance the perceptu­
al grouping. This ratio property is a special type of the proximity factor, 
which pits horizontal versus vertical proximity against each other. 
In summary, from a phenomenological point of view, one need not 
invoke completion processes of incomplete inducing elements to explain 
the previous results. They can be more easily explained in terms of per­
ceptual grouping factors, suitably understood. In particular, it is not nec­
essary that an illusory figure completes both local and global incom­
pletenesses .  Both these arguments are topics of the next section. 
3.3. Illusory figures do not necessarily complete incompletenesses 
In Figure 6a (pinna, 1 990), "a square matrix, made up of smali squares 
with a missing elemenl in Ihe left upper corner", is perceived. This is per­
ception of "incompleteness" without an illusory figure (not sufficient con­
dition). [n Figure 6b, "Ihe square marrix appears again incomplete but 
with an illusory bright square larger than the black ones and nOi occlud­
ing anything". The occlusion of one small square is more an inference than 
a perceptual resull. FUlthermore , "the foltr crossed black squares, ali 
around the largest bright one, do nOi appear incomplete or partially oc­




sory square (as reported by the subject through a sketch) and are pairwise­
colinear, which is a basic constraint that often leads to amodal completion. 
One may argue that the perceived incompleteness is global; i.e., of the 
square matrix and not of single black squares. Even if it were so, "Ihe 
square matrix does not appeal' completed" . To be completed, a small 
square should be perceived behind the illusory large square, that "does not 
appeal' occ/uding anything even if it is tangent lO the sides of fOllr black 
squares ali around, that in their turn do not appear incomplete or partial­
Iy occ/uded". To sum up, Figure 6b is a case of incompleteness that is not 
completed by an illusory square neither locally nor globally. This result 
represents a logical confutation of the role played by incompleteness if in­
























Incompletenesses are not neces­
sarily completed by illusory fig­
ures: (a) a square matrix with a 
missing element in the right up­
per corner; (b) an incomplete 
square matrix with an illusory 
bright square larger than the 
black squares and not occluding 
any element; (c) a square frame 
made up of black squares (con­
trol condition); (d) an illusory 
bright square occluding a black 
cross (control condition). 
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These perceptual results are particular­
ly interesting even in the light of Figures 
6c and 6d. By annulling the global effect 
of the matrix- that is, by leaving the just 
square frame around the large white square 
of Figure 6b, as illustrated in Figure 6c­
neither the illusory figure nor the incom­
pleteness is perceived, but "only a square 
frame made up of black squares". This re­
sult implies a global effect of the grid on 
the illusory figure formation in Figure 6b. 
By comparing this result with the one of 
Figure 6d, where the squares in the corners 
of Figure 6c are missing, another perceptu­
al result emerges: "an illusory bright 
square occluding a black cross". Under 
these conditions, "the black squares com­
piete themselves amodally in a cross par­
tially occ/uded by a large illllsory white 
square". This result is not perceived in 
Figure 6b and demonstrates that even 
complete squares can induce an i llusory 
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figure, contrary lo Iheories that assert a necessary role for incompleteness. 
However, a counterargument in favor of these theories states that, 
when the illusory figure is perceived, Ihe inducing elements complete 
themselves amodally in a more global figure different from the geomet­
rical inducing elements. Within this counterargument, incompleteness 
becomes an a posteriori result that can be defined and known only after 
the perception of the illusory figure. This kind of reasoning implies the 
same paradoxes defined in Section 2.  Nevertheless, even accepting the 
logic of this counterargument, it is phenomenologically weakened by the 
perceptual result of Figure 6b, but it will be more definitively rejected in 
Section 3.5, when more probing counterexamples will be shown. 
Figure 7 (Pinna, 1 990) reports two con­
ditions phenomenologically in agreement 
with the previous results: "an illusory rec­
tangular stripe hehind the fOllr black cen­
traL squares" (Figure 7a), and "an illusory 
diagonal of five squares demarcating the 
separation belween Ihe two halves of an in­
complete square matrix of squares" (Figure 
7b). Note that "the illusory stripe of Figure 
7a does not occlude any square, rather ap­
pears coplanar lO the other squares on its 
sides above and below, yet appears behind 
the four black squares contained in ils sur­
face". Figure 7c shows two alternative re­
sults: "a Large bright square similar lO the 
one perceived in Figure 7d, wilhfour black 
squares in its inner edges arranged along 
the arms of a virtual cross"; and "jive 
brighi squares at Ihe same piane of Ihe 
black small squares alt around them". 
These alternative percepts emphasize the 
role played by figure-ground principles in 





































Figure-ground principles induce: 
(a) an illusory rectangular stripe 
behind the four black centrai 
squares; Cb) an illusory diagonal of 
flve squares demarcating the sep­
aration between the two halves 
of an incomplete square matrix 
of squares: (c) a large bright 
square with four black squares in 
its inner edges arranged along the 
arrns of a virtual cross or, attema­
tively, five bright squares at the 
same piane of the black small 
squares ali around them: (d) a 
large bright square. 
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The perceptual results of Figure 8 differ from those of Figure 6 in 
that "incompletenesses" are here accompanied by illusory figures sim­
ilar to "scribbles oj white tint in jrant oj one entirely occ/uded (Figure 
8a) or some parlially (Figure 8b) occluded squares". In the ex peri­
ment, 1 2  out of 20 subjects reported that, in Figure 8a, "t/w scribble 
does noI occlude the entire missing square al the corner, bUI only par­
tially the lhree around it". 
The "scribble" perceived in Figure 8c, even if related to incomplete 
sguares, "appears to lie behind the crossed white bars oj a window 
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Different roles of incompletenesses in 
different form organizations: scribbles 
of white tint in front of one entirely 
occluded (a) or some partially (b) oc­
cluded squares; (c) the scribble lies be­
hind the crossed white bars of a win-
dow showing the dim interior of a 
room; (d) the inner irregular white 
shape, similar to the body of an insect, 
appears in front of the partially oc­
cluded crossed bars while its legs ap­
pear intertwined in the bars. 
I CONTRIBUTI 
described in Figure 4a. In Figure 8d, 
the inside edge of the scribble of 
Figure 8a is totaBy white and the ra­
tio between distances is changed, so 
that phenomenaBy "lhe inner irreg­
ular white shape, simitar to the body 
oj an insect, appears in jront oj the 
partially occluded crossed bars 
white its legs appear inlertwined in 
the bars". Here, the bars are both 
occluded and occluding, depending 
upon the ratios . 
On the basis of these results, the 
guestion is: Which are the inducing el­
ements, the bars or the sguares? If in­
completeness is a necessary factor, 
then the guestion has a paradoxical an­
swer: The effect is cause of its cause. In 
other words, the incompleteness of the 
bars and not of the sguares can be de­
cided only a posteriori and it becomes 
the cause of the perception of the in­
completeness of the bars and not of the 
sguares. This is paradoxical only if in­
completeness is considered a necessary 
factor. However, this criticism has in 
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the next Section 3.4 a further logical and phenomenological aspect from a 
different point of view. The new question is: Incompleteness of what? 
3.4. The shape oJ incompleteness does noI predicI Ihe shape oJ illusory 
figures 
Once the geometrical shape of "incompleteness" has been defined, 
can the shape of the illusory figure be predicted? More particularly, 
does the shape of the illusory figure correspond to the shape of incom­
pleteness? And does the shape of the illusory contours agree with the 
shape of real contours when these complete the shape of the same in­
completeness? Many experimental data demonstrate the equivalence of 
illusory contours with rea! ones. Illusory contours are like real contours 
in: producing geometrica I illusions (Farnè, 1 968; Pastore, 1 97 1 ;  
Gregory, 1 972; Bradley and Dumais, 1 975; Bradley and Petry, 1 977; 
Meyer and Garges, 1 979); in being enhanced by kinetic depth informa­
tion (Bradley and Lee, 1 982); in being subjected to apparent and stro­
boscopic motion (Sigman and Rock, 1 974; Griinau von, 1 979; 
Ramachandran, 1 985); in producing figuraI after-effects (Smith and 
aver, 1 976, 1 979; Meyer and Phillips, 1 980); in being used as targets 
or masks in visual masking experiments (Weissten et al . ,  1 974; 
Reynolds, 1 9 8 1 ) ;  and in serving in information-processing tasks as a 
landmark aiding the localization of elements in visual space (Pomerantz 
et al 1 98 1 ) .  Von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner ( 1 984), and 
Peterhans and von der Heydt ( 1987) found that neurons in cortical area 
V2 of macaques respond at locations where illusory contours are per­
ceived. These neurons respond with a similar slightly delayed excitato­
ry response to both illusory and real contours that crosses their recep­
tive fields, and both real and illusory contours produced similar orien­
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Iliusory figure 
shape differs (rom 
the shape of the 
i ncom pleteness. 
(a) An elongated 
or double lemon­
like 8 amodally in­
terweaved behind 
two single lines 
that appear curved 
is perceived de­
spite the gaps cor­
respond to three 
(ircles (b). 
Despite these results, 
Figure 9 demonstrates differ­
ences between the two kinds of 
contours. In Figure 9a, a paral­
lei distribution of horizontal 
lines encloses three circular 
gaps vertically arranged. 
However, they do not appear 
Iike three adjacent illusory cir­
cles but as "a double 8 
amodally interweaved behind 
two single Unes that appeal' 
curved" . Furthermore, "each 
dI'eu/aI' shape oJ the 8 appears 
elongated or distorted with a 
shape simi/ar IO a lemon". The 
"real" geometrica] shapes of 
the incompletenesses, shown in Figure 9b to be "three eircles", do not 
correspond to the shapes of these illusory figures. 
The mai n point is: Why should three circular gaps be completed as 
described if the simplest figures that can solve the problem of incom­
pleteness are three illusory circles? The complexity of the solution of the 
8-like shapes, including their amodal completion, is far from being con­
sidered as the simplest solution. The generai question raised by this fig­
ure is the following: If incompleteness is assumed to be a necessary fac­
tor, is it possible to predict the shape of the illusory figure that is induced 
to complete a gap in the simplest possible way? Figure 9a shows that the 
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Iliusion of angularity: the shape 
of the illusory figure concorcls 
with the shape of incomplete­
ness, but real contours don't 
(a left) An illusory disk - (a 
right) the circle appears to be 
polygonal with blunt angles di­
rected towards the inside of 
the stripes. (b left) an illusory 
polygon - (b right) the sides 
of the polygon look convex 
with swellings inside the 
stripes and the vertices ap­
pear less pointed, blunter. and 
rounded cfr. (c left) an illusory 
polygon - (c right) the poly­
gon appears more polygonal, 
pointed or sharper with the 
polygon sides appearing 5-
light I y concave and the ver­
tices seeming to go even 
more inwards into the stripes. 
Figure l O  sets the inverse problem: the shapes of illusory figures here 
are in agreement with the gaps, but, by completing the gaps with real con­
tours, the perceived shapes do not match with the ones induced by the il­
lusory figures. In Figure lOa left, "all illusory disk" is perceived filling 
the circular gap in the center of radiai stripes. By replacing the illusory 
contours with real ones (Figure lOa middle), the "illusion of angularity" 
is perceived (Figure IOa right, Pinna, 1991). "The circle appears lo be 
polygonal \Virh blunt angles direcred towards rhe inside of lhe slripes". 
When the gap is a polygon with each vertex Iying between two contigu­
ous stripes, Han illusory polygon", similar to the gap shape, appears 
(Figure IOb left). But when it is replaced by real contours (Figure IOb 
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middle) , "the sides oj /he polygon look convex wi/h swellings inside the 
stripes", "The vertices appear less pointed, blunter, and rounded oJj" 
(Figure IOb right). By viewing globally, "the polygon appears more cir­
cular than the real circle" illustrated in Figure lOa righI. If the gap is a 
polygon with vertices Iying within the black stripes (Figure 10c left), "an 
illusory polygon is perceivecf'. BUl, when it is replaced with real contours 
(Figure 10c middle), "the polygon appears more polygonal, poin/ed or 
sharper with the polygon sides appearing sligh/ly concave and the ver­
tices seeming IO go even more inwards into the stripes" (Figure I Oc right). 
On the basis of these results, the question is: If the illusory figure is the 
solution to the problem created by the gaps, then why by replacing illu­
sory with real contours - that is, by adding a reai solution to the gaps -









Inadequacy of incompleteness to predict how 
gaps should be completed. (a) A circumference 
with two missing arcs; (b) the white gaps become 
"something" (neither an illusory figure nor a gap) 
that allows one circumference to pass behind the 
other; (c) "something" that induce the incom­
plete circumference to be amodally completed 
behind the complete circle; (d) the amodal com­
pletion is less strong than in (b) and (c); (e) the 
gaps become the white illusory boundaries of 
the circumferences that appear as surfaces . 
A demonstration from another point of view of the scientific inadequa­
cy of incompleteness in predicting how gaps should be completed is shown 
by the illusory contours illustrated in Figure I I .  A circurnference with two 
missing arcs, as iJJustrated in Figure I la, is not completed, but rather ap­
pears "broken even if within the gaps some weak brightness induction is 
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perceived" . By inserting an identical circumference intersecting the gaps 
(Figure I I  b), the white gaps are not perceived anymore as such but they be­
come "something thal allows one circumference lO pass behind Ihe olher", 
that is "ll1e incomplete circumference is amodally compleled behind the 
complete circle". A similar effect is perceived in Figure I le. What is this 
"something" is hard to define phenomenally, maybe an Hillusory amodal 
completion". 1t is not an illusory figure in the known sense; "il is not an il­
lusory contour; it belongs lO neither one nor the other eire/e; il does noi ap­
pear as a gap or as incompleteness". This illusory amodal completion His 
comparable or even sfronger than the one illustrated in Figure l ld" . By in­
creasing the amplitude of the gap, the strength of the amodal completion 
and the depth stratification effects increase accordingly. 
By increasing the width of the woven circumferences and by decreas­
ing the amplitude of the gaps (see Figure I le), the illusory amodal com­
pletion persists but it assumes a different appearance: HThe gaps become 
the white boundaries of the circumferences thal appear as s!lrfaces". 
Note that "the bright illusory boundaries are perceived only along Ihe 
crossover poinls and not everywhere along Ihe circumferences". They 
are Hillusory" in the sense that they are detached from the real black re­
gion that they bound. These figures show that the real contours define a 
preferred orientation for attaching parallel illusory contours to their fig­
ure, even though these illusory contours, perceptually speaking, are real 
contours in the figure that bound, and thus complete, the black figures 
from which they are detached. In other words, these illusory contours 
define T-junctions with respect to the real contours from which they are 
detached. Again, these perceptual results and these phenomenal varia­
tions cannot be predicted from incompleteness as a sufficient condition 
for explaining illusory contour formation. 
3.5. /ncompleteness is not a necessary condition 
The most important logical condition to be studied is incompleteness 
as a necessary condition; that is, A is necessary for B if B cannot be tme 
unless A is tme. Consequently: 
(i) if the inducing elements are complete, then no illusory figure 
should be induced or, in other words, a case of complete elements induc­




Within the logical rationale of cognitive and gestalt models, incom­
pleteness is completed through depth segregation and amodal comple­
tion. Some consequences follow: 
(ii) Whenever an illusory figure is perceived, necessarily the depth 
segregation of the illusory figure relative to the inducing elements, and 
their partial occlusion should be al so perceived. 
(iii) There should never be the case of an illusory figure on the same 
depth piane (coplanar) to its inducing elements. 
At least three a!tempts have been made to disconfirm the necessary con­
dition. One of them is the "Sun effect" by Kennedy ( 1 976, 1978). By using 
triangles pointing towards a centraI open area, Kennedy demonstrated !hat 
illusory brightness can occur without amodal completion of the inducing 
elements. This is an interesting counter-example but does not completely 
disprove the role of incompleteness and completion. In fact, in the Sun ef­
fect, the illusory contours are perceived not as sharp boundaries but fuzzy 
ones, and the resulting brightness does not have the surface qualities of the 
Ehrenstein illusion, but rather appears diaphanous like a bright fog without 
defined depth segregation. Thus, this percept might be considered as a case 







Purghé ( 1 990) suggested another in­
teresting case to refute the necessary 
condition. He arranged four black oc­
tagons in a way that the centraI illu­
sory octagon appears that is tessellat­
ed to the other four ali around il. This 
limiting case of amodal completion 
uses implicit Y-junctions between the 
illusory figure and the inducing ele­
ments. The strongest refutation of the 
necessary condi tion would contain T­
junctions between the inducing ele­
ments and the illusory figure. 
By modifying the Ehrenstein fig­
ure, Ehrenstein ( 1 94 1 ) ,  Pinna ( 1 996), 
and Pinna et al. (2004) investigated 
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whether illusory figures are affected by cognitive cues that do not allow 
amodal completion. This was done by replacing Ehrenstein inducing 
lines by alphabetical letters (either normal or modified) with similar line 
terminators (Figure 1 2a and 1 2b). The perception of the letter of the al­
phabet requires a cognitive process defining the completeness of il. 
"Each lelter is perceived complete, but their radiai arrangement induces 
a strong illusory circle", thereby contradicting rule (i) whereby incom­
pleteness as a necessary factor. Rules (ii) and (iii) are al so contradicted, 
since "the illusory cin'le is perceived coplanar and tangent to the letter 
terminators". "An illusory disk with sharp contours is perceived" even if 
curved terminators (R and B) and l i  ne-end terminators are mixed. 
The three rules are refuted even by rotating Figure 1 2b in 3D space 
as illustrated in Figure 1 2c .  "The strength and sharpness oj illusory 
contours and the coplanarity oj the illusory disk are here even stronger 
than previollsly". The illusory figure persists even when there are mis­
alignments and deformations both in the inducing letter and in the il­
lusory contours (Figure 1 2d, 1 2e and 1 2f), or even if the letters of the 
alphabet appear incomplete due lO their bottoms being cuI in the shape 
of a disk. 
These various results indicate thal incompleteness is neither a neces­
sary nor a sufficient condition for inducing illusory figures, and indicate 
the need for a different explanation. However, incompleteness carries 
the idea that illusory figures make the understanding of the generai prob­
lem of figurai organization easier. This is an important point to be con­
sidered and included within such an alternative explanation. These are 
topics of the next section. 
4. The hypothesis oj figurai organization oj local inductions oj contours 
and brightness 
The questions lO answer in this section are: How can the previous 
results be inlerpreted? Can the incompleteness hypothesis be replaced 
by a new hypothesis thal overcomes Ihe previous logical and phenom­
enological problems of the incompleteness theories? Section 3 .2 
showed the role of grouping and figure-ground segregation principles 
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in inducing illusory figures . Il is proposed below that these principles 
involve both boundary COlllOur discontinuities like the wiggly concav­
ities of Figure I ,  as well as brightness illhomogeneities that are in­
duced along the same wiggly concavities or at line terminators 
(Figures 5 ,  9 ,  1 1 , 1 2) .  The line terminators are a special case of bound­
ary contour discontinuities, because of the abrupt change in contour di­
rection. These two factors clarify the more generai problem of figurai 
organization, where il lusory figures stili play a leading role. The next 
sections propose how lO overcome inadequacies of the incompleteness 
hypothesis in explaining figurai organization in terms of how percepts 
are completed in response to boundary contour discontinuities and 
brightness inhomogeneities. 
4.1.  Figural organization oj boundary contour discontinui/ies 
The problem of figurai organization has his roots in opposite quali­
ties of figure and background (Rubin, 1 9 1 5 ,  1 92 1 )  that depend on a phe­
nomenal scission between figure and background and, more generally, 
between object and reference frame (Koffka, 1 935; K6hler, 1 920; 
Metger, 1 963); namely: (i) a border is unidirectional , and belongs to the 
figure (border ownership), not to the background; (ii) a figure possesses 
a bright, compact, and opaque surface color, whereas a background 
shows a diaphanous color and appears empty; and (iii) a figure appears 
to lie above the background, whereas the background is unlimited and 
continues undemeath the figure. 
These points are illustrated in Figure 1 3 .  Consider the "electric plug­
like shape" of Figure 13a, showing two additions, and the "halj;circular 
shape" of Figure 1 3b. When they are put together, as shown in Figure 
1 3c, "a elear il/usory E is perceived and the whole pattern is read as D­
ED". "The two Ds appear on a white background, while the E is per­
ceived on a black background!'.  "No incompletenesses are present in [he 
componenl elemenls". They can be defined only after the illusory figure 
is perceived, but this implies a paradox as has already suggested. 
Instead, convexities and additions, clearly perceived in Figure 1 3a, are 
not anymore perceived as such in Figure 1 3c ,  because their boundaries 
there belong to the E and not to the plug-like shape, in Figure 1 3a, and 
thus they become background. 
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Similar examples useful for a comparison 
of the strength of the illusory letters are il­
lustrated in Figure 1 3d and 1 3e,  where 
convexities and additions are complemen­
tary to concave discontinuities and gaps. 
"The illusory E is clearly perceived in 
Figures 13d and the illusory 5 in Figure 
13e". While "t/le concave discontinuities 
(for example the three white arms of the E 
in Figure 1 3d) tend lO appear as a figure", 
"the convex additions (for example the t­
wo black additions to the D in Figure 1 3d) 
are grouped and perceived as a black 
background:'. Because the same border 
can be perceived both concave and con­
vex depending on the direction of the per­
ception - that is ,  from the left to the right 
or from the right to the left - the border of 
the two boundary conditions belongs to 
complementary regions. It is worthwhile 
noting that the two black additions to the 
D in Figure 1 3d ,  perceived as a black 
background, are not perceived as addi­
tions anymore and, as a consequence, they 
split from the D,  thus inducing "/wo illu­
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Figure-ground organization of 
boundary contour discontinu­
ities. (a) Electric plug-like 
shape; (b) half-circular shape; 
(c) by puttlng together (a) and 
(b) a clear illusory E is per­
ceived and the whole pattern 
is read as DED; (d) an illusory 
E is perceived; (e) an illusory 5 
digit emerges; (f) an illusory 
number 2 on a black back-
ground or; alternatively, an illu­
sory 2 on a black background 
with two adjacent I letters on 
both sides of the 2 digito 
arate the two regions and that belong lO the D". These illusory con­
tours disappear when the electric plug-like shape is perceived. 
These examples illustrate that the problem of illusory figures can be 
considered as part of the more generaI problem of figure-ground organ­
ization, notably of how boundaries are grouped and ungrouped in a way 
that is sensitive to figure-ground constraints. Figure-ground organization 
plays a role in illusory figure formation even if the effects of past expe­
rience are weakened. In particular, grouping and ungrouping can influ­




Figure 1 3f, the perceptual results were described as (i) "an illusory num­
ber 2", and "an illusory refiec/ed S bOlh on a black background:' or (ii) 
alternatively "an illusory number 2 on a black background wi/h two ad­
jacent / letters on bo/h sides oJ the 2 digil (/2/)". The inducing elements, 
observed separately, can be phenomenally described as "two small hor­
izonlal rectangles, each connecled lO two larger vertical rectangles". 
The percept of a 2 on a uniform black background depends on the group­
ing of the small horizontal rectangles with the two larger vertical ones. 
The percept of 121 is facilitated by the ungrouping of the small rectan­
gles from the larger ones, due to the discontinuity in the direction, of 
their boundaries, thus eliciting the illusory contour formation in between 
them, as described in Figure 1 3d.  This ungrouping makes the perception 
of the illusory 2 easier, enabling the small rectangles to lose their bound­
aries to the illusory 2 digit and enabling the large rectangles to appear as 
such or as I letters, in agreement with past experience through cognitive 
priming of the 2 .  
These phenomenal results show that the role of incompleteness can 
be similarly explained in terms of boundary contour grouping processes 
and figure-ground organization, as they apply to the perception of illu­
sory figures. Such an analysis avoids the paradoxes raised by "incom­
pleteness" as an explanatory principle, yet also provides explanations of 
the phenomena that motivated this hypothesis. In particular, boundary 
contour grouping principles: 
(i) are not restricted to specific figurai conditions like incompleteness 
but cover multiple boundary contingencies, including additions, line ter­
minators, and parallel contours (see in particular Sections 3.5 and 4 . 1 ) ;  
(ii) incorporate both local and global boundary conditions, as illus­
trated in Section 3.3;  
(iii) do not necessarily require amodal completion of inducing ele­
ments (Sections 3 .3 and 3 .5), but can induce illusory figures without 
amodal completion; 
(iv) can predict opposi te and complementary figure-ground organiza­
tions, as shown in Section 3.2; 
(v) predict the shape of illusory figures on the basis of the grouping 
of local discontinuities and their connections (Sections 3.2 and 3.4). 
Thus the shape of illusory contours is not necessarily equal to the shape 
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of real contours and to the shape of incompleteness .  
The figuraI properties of the illusory figures are accompanied by 
brightness enhancements along with the illusory figures that cannot be 
accounted for solely by the organization of brightness discontinuities. 
Both boundary grouping and surface filling-in processes work in paral­
leI, indeed are represented by parallel cortical interblob and blob streams 
from cortical areas V I through V4, to synergistically create the strong 
figuraI properties of real and illusory figures. The mode!ing articles of 
Grossberg ( 1 994, 1 997), Grossberg and Mingolla ( I  985a, 1 985b), 
Grossberg and Swaminathan (2004), Kelly and Grossberg (2000), and of 
Raizada and Grossberg (2003) propose and simulate cortical mecha­
nisms of perceptual grouping and figure-ground perception whereby 
these properties may be realized; see Section 5 .  
4.2. Figurai organization of brightness inhomogeneities 
In Figure 14a, "the radiai stripes appear partially occluded by an il­
lusory bright annulus". By replacing the illusory contours with real ones 
(see Figure 1 4b), "the annulus loses its large brightness enhancement, 
although weak brightness enhancement persists within the interspace 
between the stripe terminators". Furthermore, as in Figure IO ,  "the in­
ner and outer circles of the annulus appear as pointed arcs wedged in 
the black strips", illustrating the illusion of angularity (Pinna, 1 99 I ) .  "In 
Figure 14c, the brightness enhancement is stronger than in Figure 14b", 
due to the pairs of !ines that continue the boundaries of the stripes with­
in the interspaces. In Figure 14d, by bordering the annulus with real con­
tours, "the induced brightness next lO the stripe terminators pops out rel­
ative to the dark connecling regions lVithin the annulus". "The bright­
ness and darkness induclions are contained in separated sectors of the 
annuir,,". Due to this separation, "they are enhanced compared lO 
Figure 14c". Functioning as both filling-in generators and filling-in bar­
riers (Grossberg, 1 994, 1 997), the separation lines stop and contain both 
the brightness filling-in (see Figure 14a) and the darkness filling-in (see 
Figure 14b) along the annulus. By widening the brightness area, as illus­
trated in Figures 14e and 1 4f, "the brightness and darkness spreading ef' 
fects are dilUled, though not homogenously", as in the Kanizsa and 
Minguzzi ( 1 986) anomalous brightness differentiation and impossible 
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stairease (Eseher, 1 96 1 ;  Penrose and Penrose, 1 958) brightness illusions, 
respeetively, both of whieh are simulated in Grossberg and Todorovie 






Figurai organization of bright­
ness inhomogeneities. (a) The 
radiai stripes appear partially 
occluded by an illusory bright 
annulus: (b) the annulus loses 
its large brightness enhance­
ment, although weak brightness 
enhancement persists within 
the interspace between the 
stripe terminators; (c) the 
brightness enhancement is 
stronger than In (b); (d) the in­
duced brightness next to the 
stripe terminators pops out 
relative to the dark connecting 
regions within the annulus: (e) 
and (f) the brightness and dark­
ness spreading effects are dilut­
ed, though not homogenously. 
The eonclusions suggested by these phenomenal results are !he fol­
lowing: 
(i) Brightness induetion peeuliar to illusory figures is elieited whether 
or not (here are figurai ineompletenesses (Figures 14b-14f); 
(ii) brightness enhaneement is indueed next to eaeh stripe terminator; 
(iii) brightness inhomogeneities are indueed independently from the 
presenee of illusory or real contours; 
(iv) brightness inhomogeneities spread and fili long distanees 
(Figures 14a and 14b); 
(v) brightness spreading can be contained by both illusory and re­
al boundaries (Figures 1 4a- 1 4e) aeting as barriers; 
(vi) among brightness inhomogeneities, darkness enhancement may 
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be perceived, especially when a reaI boundary separates the respective 
regions (Figure 14d); 
(vii) bright and dark inhomogeneities mix while they spread (Figures 
14a, 1 4b, 1 4f) if they are not separated by boundaries. 
The amount of brightness and darkness induction changes by re­
placing illusory with real contours but in a manner that does not de­
pend upon incompletenesses. "Going jrom Figure 14a to Figure 14b, 
the decrease oj brightness" may not depend on the completion of the 
gap, but rather on darkness assimilation due to the parallel black lines 
among the radiaI stripes. Figure 14d supports this hypothesis. Here, the 
assimilation effect is enhanced due to the presence of the pairs of per­
pendicular parallel Iines enclosing the darkness assimilation regions 
and separating them from the brightness induction areas. The hypoth­
esis of darkness induction due to assimilation processes may be only 
part of the explanation of the perceptual result of Figure 14d. In fact, 
it appears similar to the dark spots perceived at the crossroads of the 
Hermann grid and within the circular arrangement of triangles or 
zigzag elements of Kennedy's Sun Effect. This hypothesis deserves 
further experimental atlention. 
Figure 15 
121 
ChromatlC assimilatlon effect. Surface pro­
cessing occurs parallel to boundary for­
mation, and It5 properties do not neces­
sanly derive from figurai incompleteness: 
(top) bnghtness enhancement conspicu­
ously fills the centrai gaps between the ra­
diai lines (Ehrensteln IlIuslon): (middle) 
when black rings are superimposed onto 
the I l iusory disks. the brightness enhance­
ment largely dlsappears: (bottom) howev­
er. when colored annuii replace the black 
rings. an effect much brighter than in the 
Ehrensteln illuslon occurs wlth a dense 
appearance comparable to a paste of 
bright and quasi-Iuminous white color 
added to the surface of the paper. 
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These examples of brightness induction, among others (Brigner & 
Gallagher, 1974; Frisby & Clatworthy, 1 975; Day & Jory, 1 978; Jory & 
Day, 1 979; Grossberg, 1983, 1 984, 1987a; Grossberg & Mingolla, 1 985a, 
1 985b, 1987), illustrate that surface processing is a distinct process that 
occurs parallel to boundary formation, and that its properties do not nec­
essarily derive from figuraI incompleteness properties. Figure 1 5  illus­
trates this conclusion in a vivid way. In the classical Ehrenstein illusion 
(Figure 1 5 ,  top), "brightness enhancemenl conspieuollsly fills Ihe centrai 
gaps between the radiai !ines". Ehrenstein ( 1 941 )  showed that, when 
black rings are superimposed onto the iUusory disks, "Ihe brighmess en­
hancement largely disappears" (Figure 1 5 ,  middle). This property is in a­
greement with incompleteness theories. However, when wide colored an­
nuii (e.g. purple, as in Figure 1 5 ,  bottom) are used that replace the black 
rings, brightness cancellation does not occur. Instead, it produces "an ef­
feCI mueh brighler Ihan in Ihe Ehrenslein illusion. The while disks also 
show a dense appearance comparable IO a paste of bright and quasi-lIl­
minous while color added to the surface ofthe paper" (Pinna et al., 2003). 
The cases illustrated in this section demonstrate that boundary and sur­
face formation processes are parallel, distinct, but mutually interactive 
processes that together give rise to figure-ground segregation properties. 
Indeed, brightness inhomogeneities are especial1y induced next to line ter­
minators (e.g., Figures 9a, 10a 1 2), as well as concave (e.g., Figures I b  
and 2) and convex (e.g., Figure 1 2a and 1 5) boundary discontinuities. 
5. Conclusions 
According to cognitive and gestalt theories, incompleteness was con­
sidered as a necessary and sufficient factor for illusory figure formation. 
The role of incompleteness has herein been studied in terms of its inner 
logic and through a phenomenological analysis ofnew cases. 1t is shown 
that incompleteness is neither sufficient nor necessary to induce illusory 
figures. These problems are eliminated when the incompleteness hy­
pothesis is replaced by concepts concerning interacting boundary group­
ing and surface filling-in processes during figure-ground segregation. 
These interactive boundary grouping and surface filling-in dynamics 
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give rise to the three basic figure-ground properties (phenomenal scis­
sion between figure and background, see Koffka, 1 935; Kiihler, 1 947, 
Metzger, 1 963): the unidirectional belongingness of boundaries to the il­
lusory figure, not to the background; the enhanced brightness of surface 
color under certain conditions; and the illusory figure Iying above a 
background that continues underneath the illusory figure, 
Compared to the logical and phenomenological problems coming 
from the incompleteness hypothesis, advantages of this new dynamic 
hypothesis are: 
(i) Incompleteness becomes just one property to be explained, simi­
larly to illusory figures, in terms of boundary and surface dynamics; 
(ii) boundary and surface dynamics are not restricted to properties of 
incompleteness, and are thus not subjected to incompleteness paradoxes; 
(iii) boundary formation processes can handle other kinds of discon­
tinuities than incompleteness; 
(iv) surface and boundary processes can explain both local and glob­
al levels of object rep .. esentation, including both bottom-up and top­
down levels of object representation. 
The suggested hypothesis is consistent with neurophysiological exper­
iments. Von de .. Heydt et al. ( 1 984) and Pete .. hans and von de .. Heydt 
( 1 987) demonstrated that neurons in area V2 of the monkey cortex are re­
spond to both real and illusory contours. Sasaki and Watanabe (2004) re­
ported distinct fMRI signatures in the human visual cortex for illusory 
contours and for color spreading processes, including color spreading in 
V I . Zhou et al. (2000) found a substantial f .. action of cells that are sensi­
ti ve to border-ownership in area V2; cf., Section 4. 1 .  Baylis and Driver 
(2001 )  found that neurons in monkey IT (inferotemporal) cortex,  which 
are supposed to be involved in object recognition, respond differentially to 
figure or ground, and as a consequence to borde .. ownership. Kleinschmidt 
et al. ( 1 998) in fMRI studies on figure-ground reversals found activation 
over a number of areas in occipital , temporal , parieta! and even frontal cor­
tex . fMRI studies of Kanizsa squares by Hirsch et al. ( 1 995) revealed that 
there was activation of the occipital cortex lateral to V I where signals re­
lated to segmentation were presen!. Mendola et al. ( 1999) found that sig­
nals related to illusory contours were observed in cortical area V3 and al­




The FACADE neural model of boundary and smface formation during 
figure-ground segregation (Cao and Grossberg, 2004; Grossberg, 1994, 
1997; Grossberg and Howe, 2003; Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1 997; 
Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2004; Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005; 
Kelly and Grossberg, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003) provides a con­
ceptual foundation with which to replace hypotheses about incompleteness 
with new perceptual and neural organizational principles and mechanisms 
that are not subject to the problems of the incompleteness hypotheses and 
which have begun to provide explanations of the types of data that have 
been summarized herein. Various of the percepts induced by Figures I - 1 5  
can be explained by using FA CADE model mechanisms that were de­
scribed and simulated in Grossberg ( 1994) and Kelly and Grossberg 
(2000). Several such explanations are sketched here to illustrate this daim. 
Some of the percepts illustrate how Petler's principle (Petler, 1956) is 
realized by FACADE grouping and figure-ground mechanisms. For exam­
pie, the percepts in Figures 4, 5 ,  and 8c can be explained by the fact that 
bipole grouping cells (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1 985a, 1 985b; Raizada 
and Grossberg, 2003) form real and i llusory boundaries via long-range ex­
citatory connections and shorter-range inhibitory connections. Some of the 
shorter-range inhibitory connections ensure that the groupings form in­
wardly between pairs or greater numbers of (almost) collinear contours. 
Other inhibitory connections suppress weaker boundary groupings at n­
earby positions and at different orientations and depths. 
In response to Figure 4a, boundary completion can occur between the 
exterior contours of the black disk that are interrupted by the thin white 
triangular shape, since the excitatory connections that group over the 
thin white shape have a high suppor! rafio (Shipley and Kellman, 1 992). 
In contrast, completing a collinear boundary is much more difficult be­
tween the aligned contours of two thin white triangular shapes that be­
long to different black disks. Here the support ratio is much smaller for 
the corresponding bipole cells. When the shorter-range inhibitory con­
nections of the two classes of bipole cells compete, the boundaries with­
in the circular disk win. This event is enough to trigger the figure-ground 
percept of a triangle that is partly seen through three circular holes in a 
white surface. The explanation is the same as the one given and simulat­
ed for Kanizsa stratification in Kelly and Grossberg (2000). 
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A key step in this explanation is based on a prediction made in 
Grossberg ( l 987b, 1994, 1 997) that the stronger boundary can break the 
weaker boundary where it abuts the stronger boundary, thereby creating 
a gap in the weaker boundary, This step triggers depthful figure-ground 
percepts through a feedback interaction between boundary and surface 
representations. This hypothesis has been useful in explaining many fig­
ure-ground data, most recently data about how the visual cortex gener­
ates 3D transparency and neon color spreading percepts (Grossberg and 
Yazdanbakhsh, 2005). The predicted boundary breaks may change per­
ceived brightnesses due to the spreading of contrast, through !he bound­
ary gap, between contiguous surface regions. Percepts of bistable trans­
parency provide a particularly useful way to test this hypothesis, since 
focusing attention on the boundary of one region can cause its surface to 
be seen in front of the other region, and should cause a perceived change 
in brightness .  Shifting attention to !he boundary of the other figure can 
cause its surface to be seen in front, again with a perceived change in 
brightness .  Tse (2005) has recently reported just such a perceived bright­
ness change during percepts of bistable transparency. 
Figure 4b greatly improves the support ratio of the bipole cells that 
group collinearly across a pair of black disks, since the pac man induc­
ers are considerably larger. In addition, thickening the white triangular 
regions greatly weakens the support ratio of the bipole cells that might 
attempt to complete a boundary around each black disk. In particular, 
the small triangular black regions that lies between the thicker white 
bars provide very little support for completing a boundary across each 
bar. Thickening the white regions also makes the orientations of succes­
sive contours in the black region differ more. Ali these factors work to­
gether to enable the collinear grouping into a triangle to occur. This 
event triggers the percept of a triangle in front of partially oecluded 
disks, again with the same explanation as Kanizsa stratification. Figure 
4c has a similar explanation. Figures Sa and 5b have an explanation that 
is similar to that for Figures 4a and 4b. Figure Se combines several of 
these factors by altering the relative support ratios in the left and right 
sides of the figure. 
Several of the figures probe the properties of the bipole grouping k­




include properties that were later called relatability by Kellman and 
Shipley ( 1 99 1 )  and association field by Field, Hayes, and Hess ( 1 993). 
For example, in Figure I b, the irregular bounding contours in each pair 
of contiguous black figures are relatable, and are capable of causing 
boundary completion across the intervening white regions. These 
boundaries can then pull the figure thereby formed forward and the 
black regions backwards ,  by the same mechanisms as in Kanizsa strati­
fication, thereby leading to a percept of an irregular figure in front of 
four partially occluded black squares. Figure 1 c supports this interpreta­
tion by making the irregular contours unrelatable. Figure Id,  the case of 
"articulation-without-rests", again enables illusory contours to form 
with respect to the two exterior irregular boundaries and the two ends of 
the rests. This case of boundary completion depends upon the fact that 
line ends generate a band of inducing orientations that are almost per­
pendicular to the line orientation (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1 985b), a 
fact that is crucial in generating the illusory circular boundary in the 
Ehrenstein illusion of Figure 1 5c.  Once these illusory contours are 
formed, the same figure-ground mechanisms operate again. Various cas­
es in Figure 2,  notably Figures 2b, 2c, and 2d, have similar explanations .  
So does Figure 7a. 
The explanation of the percept derived from Figure I b also raises the 
issue: Why do we not sce the il lusory bounding contour of the centrai 
figure? This property can be explained by the fact that "ali boundaries 
are invisible" within FACADE theory (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1 985b; 
Grossberg, 1 994). That is, boundaries pool over opposite contrast polar­
ities at each position, hence cannot discriminate between dark and light. 
They do this in order to create complete boundaries of objects that are 
seen in front of textured backgrounds whose relative contrasts with re­
spect to the object reverse as the object boundary is traversed. This pool­
ing of opposite contrast polarities occurs at complex cells of cortical area 
V l .  Boundaries become visible when they separate surfaces that fili-in 
different surface lightnesses, brightnesses, or colors. In Figure l b, any 
such difference in filled-in surface lightness or brightness is small be­
tween the irregular figure and the background white regions. 
The mai n differences between Figure 9a and 9b can al so be explained 
by how boundary relatability and figure-ground properties interact. In 
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Figure 9a, the horizontal lines that separate the circular open regions 
generate boundaries which are stronger than the illusory boundaries that 
bound the open regions. FACADE mechanisms explain how these hori­
zontal boundaries can be seen in front. In particular, the horizontal 
boundary that is seen in front inhibits possible redundant copies of itself 
at the same positions but further depths. This across-depth inhibition is 
part of the surface-to-boundary feedback that is used in ali FACADE fig­
ure-ground explanations. In this case, the surface is the black filled-in 
representation of the line itself. Such surface-to-boundary feedback en­
sures that perceived boundary and surface representations are consistent, 
even though tbe laws that they obey are complementary (Grossberg, 
1994). Figure-ground separation is predicted to be a consequence of this 
consistency operation. Because the redundant copi es of the horizontal 
boundary are inhibited at further depths ,  the illusory contours of the cir­
cular regions can complete behind it via relatability constraints, thereby 
completing the double 8 percept that is amodally perceived behind the 
horizontal lines. 
The percepts in Figure 1 4  can be explained using some of the same 
ideas that Grossberg and Todorovic ( 1 988) used to explain and simulate 
Kanizsa-Minghuzzi ( 1 986) anomalous brightness differentiation and the 
impossible staircase (Escher, 1 96 1 ;  Penrose, 1 958) . One idea is that ali 
brightness and darkness inductions combine when filling-in occurs with­
in a bounded region. In Figure 1 4a, these are brightness inductions that 
are generated within the anular region by the black radiaI stripes. These 
brightness inductions are trapped inside the illusory annular boundaries, 
and can fili-in freely throughout the annulus. 
In Figure 14b, the situation is more complicated due to the existence 
of the black circular contours that bound the annulus. Here, the black ra­
diai stripes can again cause brightness induction. However, the bound­
ari es that are formed at the stripe-annulus edges are stronger than the 
boundaries that are formed by the thin black annular bounding !ines. 
Whenever a stronger boundary collinearly abuts a weaker boundary, a 
boundary weakening or even a gap can form at the end of the weaker 
boundary, just as in the case of figure-ground separation that was dis­
cussed above. One can see the effects of such boundary gaps in percepts 




how they are formed by sudden changes in boundary strength 
(Grossberg and Mingolla, 1 985a). In the present case, some darkness 
spreading occurs from the black lines into the annular region. The 
brightness and darkness inductions spread during filling-in within the 
annulus, leading to a darker percept in response to Figure 14b than 
Figure 14a. 
The fact that the brightness enhancement is greater in Figure 14c than 
Figure 1 4b has a similar explanation, but here the weaker line bound­
aries are collinear with the stripe edge boundaries. Figure 1 4d prevents 
the brightness inductions from spreading through the annulus, as in 
Figure 1 4b, but combines darkness inductions from weaker line bound­
aries that are collinear with the ends and the sides of the stripe edge 
boundaries. Figures 14e and 14f support the hypothesis that the bright­
ness and darkness inductions can spread within their bounding contours. 
In particular, Figure 14f is a version of an impossible staircase. 
These explanations illustrate how FACADE concepts about 3D 
boundary completion and surface filling-in, particularly as they lead to 
3D figure-ground percepts, can be used to replace concepts about incom­
pleteness without leading to any logical paradoxes. Percepts such as 
those derived from Figures 3 and 1 3  can be explained using similar 
mechanisms, with the addition that top-down attention to familiar letters 
from inferotemporal recognition categories can also influence the pre-at­
tentive grouping processo How such pre-attentive and attentive factors 
may combine to enhance attended groupings is reviewed elsewhere; e.g., 
Grossberg ( 1 999) and Raizada and Grossberg (2003). 
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Abstract 
Cognitive and gestalt vision theories consider incompleteness to be a 
necessary and sufficient factor for inducing illusory figures. The role of 
incompleteness is studied herein by defining the inner logic subtended by 
use of the term "incompleteness", presenting new cases to clarify the phe­
nomenology of incompleteness as a necessary and sufficient condition, 
and suggesting an alternative hypothesis to explain i llusory figures after 
analyzing problems with the incompleteness hypothesis. 11 is demonstrat­
ed that incompleteness is not a sufficient condition, illusory figures do not 
necessarily complete incompletenesses, the shape of incompleteness does 
not predict the shape of illusory figures, and incompleteness is not a nec­
essary condition. Finally, it is noted that the incompleteness hypothesis 
can be replaced by concepts concerning interacting boundary grouping 
and surface filling-in processes during figure-ground segregation. The 
suggested hypothesis is consistent with neurophysiological experiments 
and is described in terms of the FACADE neural model of boundary and 
surface formation during figure-ground segregation. 
Résumé 
Les théories cognitives et de la vision de la Gestalt considèrent l'in­
complétude comme une condition nécessaire et suffisante pour induire 
des figures illusoires. Le role de l'incomplétude est donc étudié en 
définissant la logique interne que l'emploi du terme «incomplétude» 
sous-tend, en présentant de nouveaux cas pour clarifier la phénoménolo­
gie de l ' incomplétude en tant que condition nécessaire et suffisante, et 
en suggérant une hypothèse alternative pour expliquer les figures illu­
soires après avoir analysé les problèmes avec le modèle de l ' incomplé­
tude. Nou, démontrerons, au contraire , que l' incomplétude n'est pas une 
condition suffisante, que les figures illusoires ne saturent pas nécessaire­
ment l ' incomplétude, que la forme de l ' incomplétude ne prédit pas la 




tion nécessaire. Pour finir, nous observerons que l 'hypothèse de l'incom­
plétude peut etre remplacée par l'emploi de concepts qui concernent le 
groupement de contours en interaction et les procès de remplissage de 
surface pendant la ségrégation figure-fondo L'hypothèse que nous sug­
gérons est cohérente avec les expérimentations neurophysiologiques et 
elle s' inscrit dans le modèle neural des contours FACADE. 
RiassUlzto 
Sia le teorie cognitive che quelle gestaltiste considerano l'incomple­
tezza come un fattore necessario e sufficiente per l'induzione dei contor­
ni illusori. Scopo di questo lavoro è ( I )  studiare il ruolo dell'incomple­
tezza attraverso l 'analisi della logica implicita all'uso del termine "in­
completezza", (2) presentare nuove condizioni percettive utili per chiari­
re fenomenologica mente se l'incompletezza costituisca di fatto ragione 
necessaria e sufficiente e, infine, (3) proporre, successivamente all'anali­
si del ruolo svolto dall'incompletezza, un'ipotesi alternativa in grado di 
spiegare le figure illusorie. L'analisi logica e fenomenologica dell'incom­
pletezza ha dimostrato che quest'ultima non è una ragione né necessaria 
né sufficiente per il costituirsi delle figure illusorie, infatti queste ultime 
non completano le incompletezze così come la forma delle incompletez­
ze non può predire la forma delle figure illusorie. L'ipotesi dell 'incomple­
tezza può essere sostituita con una più efficace spiegazione basata sul 
raggruppamento dei contorni e sui processi di filling-in che avvengono 
durante la segregazione figura-sfondo. Questo tipo di spiegazione è coe­
rente con i dati neurofisiologici ed è, in questa sede, proposta nei termini 
del modello neurale FA CADE che descrive la formazione dei contorni e 
delle superfici durante la segregazione figura-sfondo. 
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